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From Driver of Change to Marginalized Actor: 
Egypt’s New Unionism from a comparative perspective 
Nadine Abdalla and Jonas Wolff1 
ABSTRACT 
The paper analyzes why Egypt’s labor movement, while having played a significant role in the run-
up to the 2011 revolution, has been increasingly marginalized politically ever since, failing to 
achieve either significant labor-specific gains and/or broader objectives related to the overall pro-
cess of political transformation. It does so by investigating Egypt’s movement of independent trade 
unions, the most dynamic element within the country’s labor movement, from a comparative per-
spective. Specifically, the paper uses the experience of Brazil’s New Unionism in the 1980s as a 
contrasting case, identifies the factors that have enabled and constrained what is arguably the most 
successful example of a New Unionist movement in the Global South, and applies this explanatory 
framework in an in-depth study on the trajectory of Egypt’s New Unionism since 2011. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
In analyzing the wave of popular mobilization that preceded the 2011 revolution in Egypt, scholars 
have pointed to the crucial role played by labor protests (Abdalla 2012; Beinin 2011; Beinin and 
Duboc 2013; Bishara 2012). This is in line with an important research tradition in comparative 
politics that has emphasized the working class in general and organized labor in particular as an 
important agent in processes of democratization (cf. Collier 1999; Levitsky and Mainwaring 2006; 
Rueschemeyer et al. 1992; Valenzuela 1989). With a view to Egypt’s post-revolutionary trajectory 
since 2011, however, observers – while emphasizing a persistent level of labor protests – have not-
ed the weakness of organized labor as well as its failure to either achieve significant labor-specific 
gains or to influence the country’s overall political transformation (cf. Abdalla 2012; Bishara 2014; 
Ramadan and Adly 2015). 
In this paper, we try to make sense of this shift of the Egyptian labor movement from an important 
driver of change during the destabilization of authoritarian rule to a weak, fragmented and politi-
cally marginalized actor during the post-revolutionary negotiation of the transformation process. 
We do so by analyzing Egypt’s New Unionism, the most dynamic element within the country’s 
labor movement, from a comparative perspective that places contemporary experiences in Egypt in 
the context of social movement research. In particular, we use Brazil in the 1980s as a contrasting 
case in which independent labor organizations succeeded in emancipating themselves from a state-
controlled, corporatist trade union structure to become a prominent social and political actor dur-
ing the process of democratization (cf. Alexander 2003: 171–202; Antunes and Santana 2014: 11–
16; Keck 1992; Rodrigues 1991; Sluyter-Beltrão, Jeffrey 2010; Swavely 1990). Given that Brazil’s 
novo sindicalismo, which emerged in the late 1970s in the context of a military dictatorship and 
rose to prominence in the 1980s during the country’s protracted process of controlled democrati-
zation, can plausibly be considered the most successful case of a New Unionist movement in the 
Global South, we make use of the extensive research on this case in order to identify the factors 
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that have enabled and constrained the emergence and development of this movement. This set of 
factors is, then, applied as an explanatory framework in order to analyze the trajectory of Egypt’s 
New Unionism since 2011.2 
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section (2.), the existing scholarship on Brazil’s New 
Unionism is reviewed in order to identify, based on established social movement theories, the 
factors that have been crucial in shaping the rise of independent labor organizations in this country 
since the late 1970s and, thereby, develop the explanatory framework that is, then, applied to the 
case of Egypt. In this section, also, general commonalities and differences between Brazil in the 
1980s and contemporary Egypt are discussed in order to justify the comparison of the two cases, 
while acknowledging its limits. The empirical sections, then, focus on Egypt. Following an over-
view of the emergence of a New Unionist movement before 2011 and the role of labor protests in 
the run-up to the Egyptian revolution (3.), we turn to the core of our analysis. Here, we first sum-
marize the development of Egypt’s New Unionist movement since 2011, before analyzing, sepa-
rately, the different factors that we suggest help explain the observed pattern of decline and failure 
(4.). The final section (5.) summarizes our findings and draws some overall conclusions for the 
comparative analysis of organized labor in times of political change. 
2 TOWARDS AN EXPLANATORY FRAMEWORK: THE CASE OF BRAZIL’S NEW UNIONISM 
Brazil’s independent labor movement emerged in the late 1970s with a series of strike waves. As 
part of a broader grassroots movement, these labor protests increasingly challenged the military 
regime that had ruled the country since the 1964 military coup. Important steps in the rise of Bra-
zil’s novo sindicalismo included the creation of the Workers’ Party (PT) in 1979 and the estab-
lishment of a national labor confederation, the Single Workers’ Central (CUT), in 1983. The mili-
tary dictatorship responded to these challenges with a gradual process of controlled liberalization 
and democratization that passed through the indirect election of a civilian government in 1984, the 
adoption of a new constitution in 1988, and first direct presidential elections in 1989. The new 
constitution also abolished core elements of the state corporatist structure of labor control. Brazil’s 
New Unionist movement is generally considered a key player during this decade-long process of 
democratization, even if the PT played only a limited role in the actual negotiation of political 
change and narrowly lost the 1989 presidential elections (cf. Collier 1999: 134–138; Keck 1992; 
Levitsky and Mainwaring 2006: 33; Sandoval 1998; Sluyter-Beltrão 2010: 9–14). In terms of protest 
activities, the 1980s saw extraordinary levels of labor militancy and an almost continuous rise in 
strike activity and strength, with key episodes including the initial strike waves between 1978 and 
1980, labor participation in the (failed) campaign for direct presidential elections in 1983–1984 as 
well as massive general strikes in 1986, 1987 and 1989 (Sandoval 1998: 174–194; Sluyter-Beltrão 
2010: 178–179).3 
Drawing on established approaches in social movement research, the factors that have shaped 
Brazil’s New Unionist movement can be divided into four dimensions. In line with the political 
opportunity structure approach, we consider (1) the political opportunities and constraints as 
established by the (shifting) regime context. In terms of resource mobilization theory, (2) the 
movement’s internal characteristics (socioeconomic base, internal organization, movement entre-
preneurs) as well as (3) its relations with competitors and allies are key in defining resources and 
                                                 
 
2  Several studies have emphasized the role of Egypt’s new trade unionism before, during and after the 2011 uprising. 
While some empirical studies exist that assess the state of these new trade unions (Beinin 2012) and the challenges they 
are facing (Abdalla 2012, 2015a) in the post-revolutionary period, no research to date systematically analyzes the fac-
tors that explain their weakness and marginalization. 
3  In focusing on the rise of Brazil’s New Unionism, its later development in the 1990s and, then, during the government 
led by the very Workers’ Party since 2002 is deliberately ignored (cf. Antunes and Santana 2014; Hunter 2010; Sluyter-
Beltrão 2010). 
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mobilizing structures. Finally, (4) the framing approach highlights the discursive/ideological di-
mension of mobilization processes and, in particular, the relevance of collective action frames.4 
(1) When it comes to the political opportunities and constraints that have shaped the emergence 
and political rise of Brazil’s New Unionist movement, we have to distinguish between the structur-
al context defined by the strong legacy of state corporatism and dynamic features of the political 
order that changed over the years (and were, themselves, shaped by the New Unionist movement). 
(a) State corporatism: The hierarchical, state-controlled organization of the trade union sector that 
persisted throughout the 1980s and was complemented by very restrictive labor laws that were only 
gradually liberalized had ambivalent effects on Brazil’s New Unionist movement.5 On the one 
hand, it obviously had restrictive effects on the autonomous organization and collective action of 
workers; for instance, the very creation of the Single Workers’ Central CUT in 1983 was itself ille-
gal as were all strikes organized by the New Unionist movement in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
(Sluyter-Beltrão 2010: 53–65, 145). The state-corporatist union structure also forced New Unionist 
labor activists to establish a parallel structure thereby creating a lasting division of the labor 
movement (see below). On the other hand, however, it was the very restrictive context of state 
corporatism that pushed union activities “inward”, towards the rank-and-file and their immediate 
concerns on the shop floor, thereby creating new links between workers and union representatives 
(Skidmore 1988: 204; cf. Swavely 1990: 269). Also, the emphases on trade union autonomy and 
internal democracy, which became crucial features in the rise of New Unionism (Sluyter-Beltrão 
2010: 6; see below), were clearly driven by the experience with the state-corporatist structure (cf. 
Skidmore 1988: 220; Swavely 1990: 259). Furthermore, the pattern of “state-developmentalist eco-
nomic policymaking” that largely persisted throughout the 1980s “tended to ‘universalize’ rank-
and-file militancy by casting the state as the central arbiter of worker livelihoods” (Sluyter-Beltrão 
2010: 407). 
(b) Gradual liberalization: Steps that opened spaces for public protest and signaled a gradual open-
ing-up (abertura) of the authoritarian regime established after the 1964 military coup clearly ena-
bled the emergence of Brazil’s New Unionist movement – which, then, itself contributed to push-
ing for further steps towards democracy (cf. Keck 1992: 79–81; Sluyter-Beltrão 2010: 4; Antunes 
and Santana 2014: 14). For instance, it was the reform of the party law that facilitated the creation 
of the Workers’ Party (PT) in 1979 (Keck 1992: Chapter 5; Swavely 1990: 267). At the same time, 
the authoritarian characteristics of the political regime that persisted throughout the 1980s enabled 
the New Unionist movement and its political arm, the PT, to preserve its independent course, 
avoid cooptation and use the mobilization against an illegitimate government and for democracy 
as means to unify the movement (cf. Sluyter-Beltrão 2010: xiii). Therefore, even during the first 
civilian-led (but not directly elected) government (1985–1990), the New Unionist movement “con-
tinued to exercise its independence” and, for instance, resisted the government’s call for a “social 
pact” (Swavely 1990: 259). 
(2) In terms of the New Unionist movement’s internal characteristics, the existing scholarship 
emphasizes its socioeconomic support base, its internal organization and the role of movement 
entrepreneurs. 
(a) Socioeconomic base: When it comes to the resources on which Brazil’s New Unionism could 
draw, the first thing to mention is the far-reaching changes in the country’s socioeconomic struc-
ture that preceded the movement’s emergence. These include, most notably, important advances in 
industrial development which “resulted in a significant growth of a new industrial proletariat heav-
ily concentrated in the automotive and metallurgical industrial belt of the ABC region of São Pau-
lo” (Antunes and Santana 2014: 13; cf. Keck 1992: 78; Swavely 1990: 265) and characterized by high 
                                                 
 
4  In line with the contentious politics approach as proposed, in particular, by Tilly and Tarrow, we do not consider these 
different theories, mechanisms and factors as competing, but as complementary. For overviews, see McAdam et al. 
2001; Tarrow 2011). 
5  On Brazil’s state corporatism and the corresponding trade union structure, see Alexander (2003), Boito (1994), Skid-
more (1988), Sluyter-Beltrão (2010: 53–65). 
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levels of unionization (Valenzuela 1989: 453).6 At the same time, the 1980s saw an important 
growth in “white-collar unionism” which made “the service sector (liberal professionals, bank 
workers, and transportation workers) and public employees” increasingly important forces within 
the CUT (Keck 1992: 191; cf. Antunes and Santana 2014: 13; Rodrigues 1991: 41; Swavely 1990 
269). 
(b) Internal organization: A crucial factor that concerns the internal operation of the New Unionist 
movement and that is generally considered key to its success in mobilizing an increasing share of 
Brazil’s labor force is related to its combining of the establishment of a central labor organization 
capable of acting collectively at the national level with a consistent commitment to grass-roots 
participation and internal democracy. The former feature refers to the creation of the CUT as an 
independent labor confederation that, in operating outside the state-controlled trade union struc-
ture and cutting across geographical and sectoral divides, made the New Unionist movement ca-
pable of acting collectively and representing the independent labor movement at the national level 
(cf. Alexander 2003: 181–185; Keck 1992: 3, 188–190; Sluyter-Beltrão 2010: 9–14). At the same 
time, the commitment to “internal democracy”, in particular, implied a “priority of active rank-
and-file participation, which worked to maintain movement solidarity by involving and empower-
ing members” (Sluyter-Beltrão 2010: 6). This “strategy based on grassroots activism” (Skidmore 
1988: 297) proved very successful. The years immediately following its creation in 1983 saw an 
“unmatched organizational expansion” of the CUT (Sluyter-Beltrão 2010: 181): from 500 affiliated 
unions (1983) to over 1,000 (1985) to nearly 1,400 (1986) (Swavely 1990: 269). 
(c) Movement entrepreneurs: In her study on the Workers’ Party, Keck has emphasized the “na-
tionally known labor leadership associated with the new unionism” as a crucial factor that enabled 
the successful formation of the PT (Keck 1992: 72). This generally holds true for the New Unionist 
movement as well. From the very beginning, labor leader Luís Inácio Lula da Silva was “the key 
figure”, having been “primarily responsible for sparking the campaigns and strikes that increased 
the power of the whole Brazilian labor movement” (Keck 1992: 77; cf. Sluyter-Beltrão 2010: 2, 49; 
Swavely 1990: 266–268). 
(3) When it comes to labor movements, particular features that shape their strength and behavior 
concern the unity or division of the trade union sector, organized labor’s partisan linkages and 
broader social alliances (cf. Levitsky and Mainwaring 2006; Valenzuela 1989). In the case of Brazil’s 
New Unionist movement, a persistent division of the overall labor movement contrasted with the 
successful construction of broad coalition of social allies that became manifest in the creation of 
the Workers’ Party.  
(a) Unity/division of the labor movement: The very emergence of New Unionism produced a divi-
sion of Brazil’s overall labor movement into an official and an independent wing that has persisted 
ever since.7 Throughout the 1980s, the official, pyramidal structure that consisted of unions (at the 
municipal level, not at the individual company-level!), federations and confederations that were 
organized along the lines of different sectors remained. Given that the New Unionist movement 
emerged precisely in opposition to this hierarchical and state-controlled structure, it meant con-
structing an alternative “from the base” (Swavely 1990: 268; cf. Antunes and Santana 2014: 14). At 
the level of national politics, this division was reflected in the rivalry between the National Coordi-
nator of the Working Class (CONCLAT), later General Workers’ Confederation (CGT), which 
represented the former wing, and the CUT, which represented the latter. Programmatically, the 
main differences dividing the two labor confederations consisted in the CONCLAT/CGT’s will-
ingness to work within the official trade union structure, to accept a gradualist approach towards 
political reforms and to negotiate with the government, which contrasted with the CUT’s aim to 
construct an autonomous labor movement and to push for a radical process of political change 
                                                 
 
6  According to Keck (1992: 12), between 1960 and 1980 combined employment in manufacturing, mining, construction, 
and transportation “tripled in absolute terms”, rising from 20 to almost 30 percent of the economically active popula-
tion. 
7  The actual divisions within the Brazilian labor movements in the 1980s were certainly much more complex than this 
notion of a confrontation between two wings suggests (cf. Sluyter-Beltrão 2010: 39–53). 
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through a strategy of mobilization and confrontation (cf. Alexander 2003: 181–190; Keck 1992: 
171–177; Swavely 1990: 268–269). These differences, at the same time, reflected, and were rein-
forced by, partisan divisions: While CONCLAT/CGT was dominated by the traditional parties of 
the organized left, the group of CUT labor leaders largely overlapped with the leadership of the 
newly formed PT (Keck 1992; 177–190; cf. Rodrigues 1991; Skidmore 1988: 289, see below). In 
1986, well over half of Brazil’s then 5,500 labor unions were “affiliated with either the CGT or the 
CUT”, with both organizing between 1,300 and 1,400 unions (Swavely 1990: 269).8 Only under 
very particular circumstances, such as in the case of the 1986 general strike, CGT and CUT coop-
erated (Swavely 1990: 260). 
(b) Partisan linkages and sociopolitical allies: The New Unionist movement’s emphasis on auton-
omy was not only directed against the state and the state-controlled trade union structure, but also 
meant deep-seated distrust of the whole range of established parties, including those on the left, 
that were generally considered to be “enemies” in the fight for independent unions and seen as not 
genuinely speaking for the workers (Skidmore 1988: 220). At the same time, however, New Union-
ism in Brazil benefited from relations with a broad set of old and new social movements that dur-
ing the 1970s started to experience a general upsurge. From the very beginning of the New Union-
ist movement, therefore, labor activists could connect with other social organizations including 
“increasingly active ‘Ecclesial Base Communities (CEBs)’” as well as “a plethora of local move-
ments around such issues as transport, sewers, housing, and health care” at the local neighborhood 
level (Keck 1992: 78–79). According to Sluyter-Beltrão (2010: 11–12), “it was the New Unionism’s 
success at this intermediate level – building cross-cutting, interwoven activist networks – that 
ultimately assured the expansion and consolidation of the New Unionist project both ‘downward’ 
into previously marginalized, disengaged communities and ‘upward’ into the mainstream political 
system.” (Sluyter-Beltrão 2010: 11–12) The most important political expression of this broad soci-
opolitical alliance built around the New Unionist leadership was certainly the Workers’ Party that 
had been created in 1979 (cf. Keck 1992). The PT brought together a “mix” “between ‘old’ and 
‘new’ types of movements”, with the “glue” holding all these elements together being “their com-
mon condition of exclusion from the political agenda in Brazil” (Keck 1992: 15; cf. Alexander 2003: 
177–181; Sluyter-Beltrão 2010: 4). While there was no formal link between the labor move-
ment/CUT and the PT, de facto the relationship was very close and the party’s role was clearly “to 
support initiatives taken by the unions” (Keck 1992: 168).9 Initially, the PT was rather unsuccessful 
election-wise, but this changed towards the end of the 1980s and in 1989, in the country’s first 
direct presidential elections since 1960, the PT candidate Lula only narrowly lost the runoff elec-
tion (Keck 1992: 123–166). In general, the PT gave the New Unionist labor movement a public 
voice in the country’s political debate, including in parliament and the Constituent Assembly (cf. 
Keck 1992: 225; Swavely 1990: 260). 
(4) Collective action frame: At the discursive/ideological level, the New Unionist movement’s suc-
cess in Brazil cannot be understood without considering the mutually reinforcing elements of its 
collective action frame that only enabled it to seize political opportunities, appropriate resources 
and establish sociopolitical alliances as outlined above. This collective action frame, most notably, 
combined (a) a focus on concrete workers’ needs that helped mobilize the rank-and-file at the shop 
floor levels10 and popular sectors in general;11 (b) a broader trade union-specific agenda directed 
                                                 
 
8  It is, however, important to add that, at that time, “only 10 to 20 percent of the Brazilian work force” was unionized. In 
addition, “the rural workers’ confederation, CONTAG, which is independent of the centrals, has many more members 
than the CUT and CGT combined” (Swavely 1990: 269). 
9  “The PT was founded largely at the initiative of labor leaders, who continued to dominate its leadership and remained 
the key spokespersons for the party; the national image of the party was inextricably linked to the figure of Lula. […] 
The party’s enumeration of its political demands has always been heavily centered around the question of trade union 
rights.” (Keck 1992: 167–168) “The overlap in leadership personnel in the major unions identified with PT positions, 
the labor leaders involved in the party, and the heads of the Central Labor Organization (CUT) created in São Bernardo 
in 1983 was virtually complete.” (Keck 1992: 181) 
10  As in the “wage recovery campaign” and the first New Unionist strikes of the late 1970s (cf. Keck 1992: 64–67; Skid-
more 1988: 204–206; 212–215; Sluyter-Beltrão 2010: 9–14; Swavely 1990: 266). 
11  As during the general strikes of the 1980s (cf. Skidmore 1988: 289–298; Swavely 1990: 260, 268, 274). 
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against state-corporatist institutions and restrictions on labor freedom that united the overall 
movement of independent trade unions (CUT);12 (c) a general pro-democracy and social justice 
agenda that enabled claim bridging with a larger set of oppositional organizations and move-
ments;13 and (d) a belief that these aims were to be achieved basically through mobilizing people 
and confronting the powers-that-be14 (cf. Keck 1992: Chapter 4; Sluyter-Beltrão 2010; Swavely 
1990). 
Before applying this explanatory framework to the case at hand it is important to briefly assess 
commonalities and differences between Brazil in the 1980s and contemporary Egypt. The most 
important common feature that makes it promising to use insights from Brazil in order to analyze 
Egypt is the starting point that bears some interesting parallels. In both cases, the New Unionist 
movement emerges in the context of an authoritarian regime that, in the terminology used by 
Valenzuela (1989: 462) to describe Brazil between 1973 and 1985, can be characterized as “syndi-
cally harsh and politically open”. Also, in both instances, the upsurge in labor protests led by the 
New Unionist movement played an important role in destabilizing the existing authoritarian re-
gime (cf. Beinin and Duboc 2013; Collier 1999: 135–138). Furthermore, the gradual liberalization 
and ultimately successful democratization in the case of Brazil certainly differs from the ruptures 
and the back-and-forth that have characterized the still far from settled process of political trans-
formation in Egypt since 2011. Still, even if we can, for the time being, not talk about a transition to 
democracy in Egypt, the crucial role that the Egyptian military has played in steering the process of 
change means that the post-revolutionary pattern in Egypt bears resemblance to the “transition 
game” à la Brazil, which has been characterized by “a protracted series of moves and countermoves 
and formal and informal negotiations between authoritarian incumbents and moderate opposition 
party actors” (Collier 1999: 132). The reestablishment of an authoritarian rule in Egypt and a top-
down attempt to legitimize the military rule in the aftermath of Morsi’s ouster is, at least in some 
regards, similar to the strategy of Brazil’s military rulers in the 1980s which “sought legitimation 
through a façade of civilian rule operating through a chosen set of politicians and a restricted elec-
toral arena” (Collier 1999: 133). While the starting point and the overall context in the two coun-
tries are, thus, characterized by an important number of commonalities, the trajectory of the New 
Unionist movements in Brazil in the 1980s and in Egypt since 2011 are remarkably different. 
Nothing resembling the Brazilian New Unionist movement’s rise in social and political organiza-
tion, contentious action and political participation can be observed in the case of Egypt, quite the 
contrary. This makes it promising to systematically investigate which differences between the two 
cases help explain the apparent failure of the New Unionist challenge in contemporary Egypt. 
3 BRIEF OVERVIEW: THE EMERGENCE OF NEW UNIONISM IN EGYPT AND ITS ROLE IN THE 
RUN-UP TO THE 2011 REVOLUTION 
Egypt has a long history of labor activism (Beinin and Luckman 1998). Starting in 2006, however, 
the country experienced the “longest and strongest wave of workers protest since the end of World 
War II” (Benin and El-Hamalawi 2007). These protests responded to the neoliberal economic 
reforms implemented by the government of Ahmed Nazif (2004–2011) which dramatically deep-
ened socioeconomic inequality (Abdalla 2012: 1). The workers’ protests which had increased since 
the end of 2004 doubled after the labor strike at the Misr Spinning and Weaving Company in Al-
Mahalla Al-Kubra, “a public-sector firm and one of the largest enterprises in Egypt with about 
24,000 workers” in December 2006 (Abdalla 2012: 86). In the following years, the number of labor 
protests increased from 266 in 2006, to 614 in 2007, to 630 in 2008 and 700 in 2009 (Beinin 
                                                 
 
12  On the CUT agenda in this regard, cf. Skidmore (1998: 289–298); Sluyter-Beltrão (2010: 53–65); Swavely (1990: 271–
272). 
13  As, for instance, in the 1985 campaign for direct presidential elections (cf. Antunes and Santana 2014: 14–15; Swavely 
1990: 268). 
14  On the New Unionist’s militancy, combativeness and radical agenda, cf. Sluyter-Beltrão (2010: 10, 173–174, 179–180). 
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2011:191). In this context, the Center of Trade Union and Workers Services (CTUWS) (Dar el-
Khadamat al-Nekabeya wel Omaleya), an NGO founded in 1999, played an important role in 
providing legal and technical support for the labor protestors in Mahalla Al-Kubra as well as in 
other regions.15 This wave of protests involved not only traditionally militant blue-collar workers, 
but also previously quiescent employees and workers from within the state’s own administrative 
apparatus, such as ministries and government agencies. Given that the Egyptian Trade Union 
Federation (ETUF) was fully under the control of the regime, these labor protests emerged at the 
grassroots level and outside the official trade union structure. 
As a result, at the time of the 2011 uprising, an incipient independent labor movement had 
emerged – even if only very few independent trade unions had already been established prior to 
January 2011. In late 2008, the leader of the real estate tax collectors’ movement, Kamal Abu Eita, 
established the first independent union, thereby directly challenging the state corporatist system in 
place. Before the ouster of Mubarak, three groups – namely pensioners, teachers, and health tech-
nicians – followed this example and likewise founded new, independent unions. In the aftermath 
of the 2011 uprising, however, new trade unions emerged at lightning speed. Hundreds of new 
unions were regrouped under the umbrella of several trade unions federations. Two of them stand 
out: First, the Egyptian Federation for Independent Trade Unions (EFITU) whose existence was 
announced on by its founder, Abu Eita, at a press conference on 30 January 2011 in Cairo’s Tahrir 
Square, and which was officially launched on 2 March 2011; second, the Egyptian Democratic 
Labor Congress (EDLC) which was also formed in 2011 by the head of the CTUWS, Kamal Abbas, 
but was formally established as a trade union federation only on 24 April 2013.  
Scholars have offered competing explanations of the remarkable emergence of labor protests in 
Egypt prior to the 2011 uprising. From a traditional Marxist perspective, Beinin (2009) has ana-
lyzed the recent cycle of labor mobilization as expressing an ongoing class struggle that is histori-
cally shaped by industrial modernism, colonialism and nationalism and currently triggered by 
neoliberal economic policies (cf. Benin and Duboc 2013). From a Gramscian point of view, El-
Mahdi (2011) has argued that the adoption of neoliberal policies meant the rupture of the old pact 
between the state and the workers that had previously prevented broader labor resistance. Others 
have applied social movement theory, emphasizing the role of political opportunities and mobiliz-
ing structures. The liberalization of the mass media in 2005, for instance, has been identified as an 
example of increasing political opportunities that facilitated the emergence of labor protests prior 
to the 2011 uprising (Al-Shobaki 2010; Shehata 2010). 
During the 2011 uprising, organized labor was neither at the forefront of a pro-democracy move-
ment nor did it uniformly articulate a pro-democracy stance (Bishara 2012). Yet, workers and, 
finally, also the incipient independent labor movement still played a decisive role in bringing down 
the authoritarian regime. In the demonstrations on 25 January 2011, many workers as well as the 
majority of labor leaders participated, but did so on an individual basis, as normal citizens and not 
as members of particular organization. On 30 January, however, a group of independent trade 
unions formed EFITU in what has been described as “a revolutionary act” that openly challenged 
both ETUF’s monopoly on union representation and the regime as such (Beinin and Duboc 2013: 
223). When, in early February, demonstrations decreased and the masses began to leave Tahrir 
square, workers across many sectors began to strike, refusing to work until their rights were duly 
recognized. Their protests quickly spread across the country.16 Participants came from several 
sectors and included farmers, employees as well as workers from different companies and factories 
in both the private and the public sector. Their demands focused on improving living conditions, 
increasing wages and salaries, and bonuses. These labor protests paralyzed the economy, along 
with main state facilities, and thereby created a setting of large-scale civil disobedience that pre-
                                                 
 
15  At that time, the CTUWS had headquarters in the industrial cities of Mahalla Al-Kobra and Helwan. After the 2011 
uprising, it established a third headquarter in Cairo. 
16  According to “Al-Masry Al-Youm” newspaper, protests increased from few protests on 7 February in a number of 
governorates to 20 protests on 8 February in 9 governorates, to 35 protests on 10 February in 14 governorates, and to 
65 protests on 11 February, that is, on the day the president stepped down. 
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pared the ground for the revolution (Abdalla 2012: 89). As a result, even if the independent labor 
movement was still lacking an organizational structure, labor protests did play a crucial role in the 
2011 uprising (Bishara 2012, Beinin 2011). 
4 EGYPT’S NEW UNIONISM SINCE 2011: EXPLAINING THE POLITICAL MARGINALIZATION OF 
THE COUNTRY’S LABOR MOVEMENT AFTER THE REVOLUTION 
The uprising and the successful ouster of Mubarak initially led to a rapid growth and consolidation 
of the new labor movement made up of independent trade unions. Across different sectors of the 
economy, farmers, private-sector workers, public transport drivers, and employees established new 
trade unions outside the official ETUF structure (Abdalla 2012: 90). In the course of 2011 and 
2012, several new labor federations were founded in order to organize this new sector of independ-
ent unions, the most important ones being the already mentioned EFITU and its main competitor, 
EDLC. At the same time, the number of labor protests continued to increase: from 580 protests in 
2010 to 1,400 in 2011 and 3,400 in 2012 (Beinin 2013). 
In principle, the 2011 uprising opened up an opportunity to renegotiate the rules of labor repre-
sentation with a view to establishing a new pattern of state-labor relations in Egypt. The different 
governments that emerged from the uprising, however, generally stuck both to the neoliberal 
agenda and to the state-corporatist politics of labor control established by their predecessors. Simi-
lar to the Mubarak regime, governments continued to contain the labor movement through ETUF 
and prevent any attempt to emancipate itself from state control. On its part, the new trade union 
movement was not able to resist this strategy and effectively push for changes in either state-labor 
relations or the socioeconomic situation of the workers. In this section, we try to explain this fail-
ure of the new labor movement. In line with the explanatory framework developed above, we start 
by analyzing the political opportunities and constraints that shaped the emergence and develop-
ment of the new trade union movement in Egypt. Second, we turn to the movement’s internal 
characteristics, including its fragmentation and organizational weakness. Third, we look at the new 
labor movement’s relationships (both supportive and obstructive) with other social and political 
organizations. Finally, we analyze the collective action frames that have enabled and constrained 
the new Unionist movement since 2011. 
4.1 Political opportunities and constraints 
Similar to the Brazilian case, the state corporatist structure established by the post-colonial state 
shaped the emergence and the development of Egypt’s new trade union movement in an ambiva-
lent way: On the one hand, Law 35 promulgated in 1976, by recognizing ETUF as the only legal 
federal body of labor representation, severely restricted the emergence of independent trade un-
ions. On the other hand, the disconnection between the coopted ETUF leaders and rank-and-file 
workers enabled and legitimized the search for alternative channels to address grievances and 
make claims. In this context, the opening up of the political space following the 2011 uprising 
presented a golden opportunity for workers, which was reflected in the rapid spread of new trade 
unions.  
(a) State corporatism 
Egypt’s state corporatism, as established in the post-colonial era by Nasser, provided organized 
workers (and other social sectors) with certain benefits such as the job security, better working 
conditions, free education and health. In return, workers had to give up their political freedoms 
(Ayubi, cited in Pratt 1998: 4). This regime of controlled labor representation took shape on 30 
January 1957 when Nasser created ETUF and appointed the entire executive board. During the 
Nasser era, state-labor relations were characterized by an explicit agreement between union leaders 
and the regime (Beinin and Lockman 1998: 444) in which labor leaders agreed to support the Nas-
9 
 
PRIF Working Paper No. 31 
ser regime and abandoned their right to strike in exchange for a guaranteed fulfillment of certain 
socioeconomic demands, especially job security.  
Nasser’s successors Sadat (1970–1981) and Mubarak (1981–2011) turned to economic liberaliza-
tion and, thereby, generated a gradual retreat of the state from socio-economic activities. Still, state 
cooptation of organized labor through ETUF persisted as did the authoritarian regime. Mubarak 
even increased the state’s control over the union federation by means of a series of legal reforms 
designed to co-opt the Federation’s leadership while preventing vertical rotation within the organi-
zation (Pratt 2001: 117–118). Although state intervention in the union’s internal elections was a 
well-known practice, the intervention by Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif’s technocratic government 
(2004–2011) in ETUF’s internal elections in 2006 was remarkably higher than in the 1980s and the 
1990s. Reportedly, between 10,000 and 30,000 candidates were prevented from participating in the 
elections and fraud took place at all levels of the organization, in contrast to previous elections in 
which fraud was limited to leadership positions at the top of the Federation’s hierarchy (Clement 
2006: 109). A prominent case included Kamal Abu Eita, the leading figure of the real estate tax 
collectors’ movement and pioneer of Egypt’s new trade unionism, whose electoral victory was 
prevented through the direct interference on the part of state security.17 
In the end, the exceptionally high level of interference negatively affected the government's ability 
to exercise effective co-optation. While the number of regime supporters in the corporatist struc-
ture increased, the union structure was delegitimized and the rift between the official labor leader-
ship and regular workers deepened. The extensive fraud of 2006 closed all existing mediation 
channels between the workers and the regime. In order to make their demands heard, workers had 
therefore to resist and bypass the official trade union structure. The result was the wave of labor 
protests mentioned above. At the same time, the electoral fraud pushed militant labor leaders to 
renounce their previous strategy of “reform from within”. They, thus, started to opt for the founda-
tion of new trade unions.18 In late 2008, the leader of the real estate tax collectors’ movement, 
Kamal Abu Eita, established the first independent union, thereby directly challenging the state 
corporatist system in place. Before the ouster of Mubarak, three groups – namely pensioners, 
teachers, and health technicians – followed this example and likewise founded new, independent 
unions. 
(b) The 2011 uprising and the temporary opening of the political space 
Under the chairmanship of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), Minister of Labor 
Ahmed El-Borei issued a decree in March 2011 that established the right for independent trade 
unions to register with the Ministry of Labor. This was followed by a social dialogue that involved 
representatives of the new unions and labor activists of the Muslim Brotherhood as well as repre-
sentatives of the chambers of commerce and industry. In this dialogue, a draft law was debated that 
would have guaranteed the freedom of association for labor unions. In the end, however, the SCAF 
refused to promulgate the law (Abdalla 2015a).  
As already mentioned above, the temporary opening up of political space that was forced upon the 
regime by the 2011 uprising significantly facilitated the spread of independent trade unions, the 
establishment of new labor federations as well as the continuing increase in labor protests. At the 
same time, as will be discussed below (4.2, 4.3), the new context, in which hopes for change com-
bined with strong continuities (e.g., in terms of state corporatist control of organized labor) and a 
re-stabilization of authoritarian rule, posed a series of dilemmas to the new labor movement and 
produced important splits within the sector of independent trade unions and complicated their 
relations with sociopolitical rivals and allies.  
                                                 
 
17  Interview with Kamal Abu Eita, the head of the real estate tax collector movement, Cairo, summer 2011. 
18  Ibid. 
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4.2 Internal characteristics of the New Unionist movement in Egypt 
In this section, we analyze the socioeconomic base, the internal organization and the leadership of 
the new labor movement. Compared with Brazil’s New Unionism in the 1980s, Egypt’s independ-
ent labor movement has lacked penetration, independence and internal democracy. Furthermore, 
while prominent movement leaders did exist and played important roles, the dependence of the 
movement on them has weakened the latter. 
(a) Socioeconomic base 
Economic liberalization, as accelerated under Mubarak, has negatively affected the social condi-
tions of the workers and the employees in the public sector, thereby provoking an increase of labor 
mobilization. These policies have also pushed for the emergence of labor militancy in some parts of 
the private sector.  
Labor protests, in particular, responded to the neoliberal policies adopted by the Nazif government 
after 2004, which resulted in a dramatic decline of real wages: In 2007, for instance, the monthly 
basic salary of industrial workers was around USD 19 (Beinin 2011: 187), while the average base 
salary for textile workers in the first half of the 2000s was USD 36 (El-Naggar 2009: 49).19 As these 
losses affected both industrial workers in the public sector and civil servants, protests increased 
among both blue- and white-collar workers. Yet, independent trade unions emerged mostly among 
civil servants and service public sector workers. In contrast to Brazil’s New Unionism, Egypt’s new 
labor movement remained weak among industrial workers (whether public or private) as well as, 
in general, in the private sector. 
In Egypt, strongly representative new trade unions with a corresponding capacity of collective 
action exist among civil servants. This includes the real-estate tax collectors and the teachers 
(whose news unions are affiliated to EFITU) as well as sales tax collectors (whose new union is 
affiliated to EDLC). These new trade unions were built upon the protests organized during the 
Mubarak era. With the experience of collective action, increasingly strong bonds were built be-
tween the labor leader and the rank and file. This capacity of the organized civil servants to exert 
pressure was proven in January 2016, when they managed to lobby and push parliament to reject 
the draft Civil Service Law No. 18 of 2015 (which was meant to replace the Civil Service Law No. 
47 of 1976).20 In the public service sector, strong new trade unions also exist among public 
transport and post office workers (whose unions are affiliated to EDLC) as well as in the Egyptian 
telecommunication sector (whose union was affiliated to EFITU and joined EDLC in early 2016). 
Again, the strength and representativeness of these new trade unions stem from their previous 
collective experience during the Mubarak era.21 
In contrast, blue-collar workers in the public industrial sector mostly continued to remain orga-
nized under the ETUF umbrella. This is mainly because of material benefits associated with partic-
ipation in the official union structure. ETUF still holds a monopoly on the social funds that pro-
vide social security services and pensions to union members. Contributions to these funds are part 
of the workers’ membership fees for ETUF, which are usually deducted automatically from their 
salaries (Beinin 2012: 13). In addition, ETUF owns assets such as hospitals and clubs and offers 
entertainment such as beach holidays to its members. These are important incentives that prevent 
workers from leaving ETUF despite of its lack of responsiveness to workers’ claims.22  
                                                 
 
19  Thus, according to El-Naggar, most public sector workers and their families could be considered “poor” by the stand-
ards of the World Bank (living on less than USD 2 per day per person). 
20  This new law, in particular, aimed at significantly decreasing the salaries of the state employees by reducing the rate of 
annual increase of the civil servants’ salaries (Adly and Ramadan 2015). 
21  Strikes by the public transportation workers and the telecommunication workers on 8 February 2011 significantly 
contributed to the ouster of Mubarak (Abdalla 2012: 89). While no specific laws related to the public sector were issues 
of special contention in the aftermath of the 2011, these unions engaged in several contentious episodes with the 
state/employer in order to push for their socioeconomic demands. 
22  While these funds go mostly to the industrial workers, some of the civil servants also benefit from them. 
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With the intensification of privatizations since 2004, the private sector has come to play an increas-
ingly important role in the Egyptian economy. In 2010/2011, it represented 73 percent of the Egyp-
tian workforce (Roll 2013:7). However, the private sector is characterized by small and medium-
sized companies.23 As a consequence, wage work in the private sector is predominantly irregular 
and informal (Assaad and Kraft 2013:10).24 Under such conditions, private employers make use of 
their powerful position vis-à-vis their employees, often depriving them entirely of their labor rights 
to association, strike as well as to legal and social protection. Therefore, workers face a high risk of 
getting fired if they engage in labor activism.25 In contrast to the public sector, 44.2% of the work-
ers in the private sector have no legal contract and only 25% have health security (CAPMAS, 
2014). Furthermore, the “topography” of the factories in the private sector which are not only 
small but also geographically scattered make it more difficult for workers to organize. 
As a consequence, the presence of the new trade unions remains weak precisely in the private sec-
tor which currently employs the majority of Egyptian workers. Exceptions include a few specific 
industrial areas: With support of the Industrial Global Union (IGU), trade unions affiliated with 
the EDLC have consolidated a significant presence in the textile sector in Madinat El-Sadat & El-
Asher men Ramadan and in the petrol industrial sector in the Suez Canal Cities.26 But generally, 
the incapacity of the new trade union movement to defend those who lose their job because of 
their activism reduces its legitimacy among private sector workers.  
In sum, even if precise data is lacking, only a tiny minority of the national workforce is organized 
by the new trade unions. According to the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics 
(CAPMAS 2014), in 2014 there were 23.9 million workers in Egypt and 61.1% of them were sala-
ried. The new trade unions’ federations together can be estimated to represent around 8% of the 
total work force, as compared to around 16% organized by ETUF.27 Compared with the Brazilian 
experience, Egypt’s new trade unions particularly suffer from a weak presence in work places in the 
industrial sector (public and private), including in those (public sector) industries characterized by 
a high concentration of workers in the same factory as well as in those (private sector) companies 
that hire the majority of the people. This clearly reduces their capacity not only to defend the inter-
ests and rights of their fellow members but also their ability to push for genuine change in terms of 
their relation with the state. 
(b) Internal organization 
Similar to Brazil, the new trade unions tried to unite in nation-wide federations in order to in-
crease their political impact. But in the case of Egypt, they were not able to build one unitary feder-
ation for the New Unionist movement at the national level but split into several organizations. This 
                                                 
 
23  In 2006, just 0.1 % of private companies in Egypt employed more than 100 workers (Roll 2013:8), and only 4% of 
employment in the private sector in 2012 was in firms with 50–99 employees. Employment in the private sector con-
tinues to be dominated by firms with 1–4 employees (Assaad and Kraft 2013:9–10). 
24  Moreover, from 2006 to 2012, the irregular wage work increased substantially. Irregular work is seasonal or intermit-
tent work. While 12% of the employed were irregular wage workers in 1998, this had fallen to 8% in 2006, but had more 
than doubled to 17% of the employed in 2012 (Assaad and Kraft 2013:3–4). 
25  CTUWS has documented several cases in which workers were fired just after organizing protests. In other cases, ac-
cording to CTUWS, newly hired workers were obliged to sign an un-dated document in which they submit their resig-
nations, giving the employer the liberty to fire workers at any given moment and with no legal protection whatsoever 
(Abdalla 2012). 
26  Interview with Mohamed Mostafa, ILO officer in Egypt, January 2016, Cairo. 
27  ETUF claims to represent 3.8 million workers, while EDLC claims to have 886,000 members. According to EFITU’s 
head Kamal Abu Eita, 2.4 million workers are affiliated with his organization. However, because of the splits that oc-
curred during the last years as well as EFITU’s incorporation of trade unions that were rather shallow organizations 
representing only a small share of the workers in their respective sector, this number can hardly be considered accurate. 
Therefore, this research assumes that EFITU has currently roughly the same number of members as EDLC. In addi-
tion, it is worth noting that there is a significant overlap between the membership in the old and the new trade union 
federations because many workers who joined the new trade unions did not withdraw from ETUF in order to avoid 
losing their rights to social funds. 
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division, at least in part, resulted from a series of dilemmas that the new trade unions had to deal 
with since early 2011.  
First, the new trade unions faced a structural dilemma: Their leader had to decide whether they 
should directly start to organize the newly emerging local unions into a nation-wide federation for 
the sake of being able to negotiate with the authorities in the name of a certain defined group; or 
whether they should focus, for a certain period of time, on building powerful local union that 
could serve as a basis for a reliable bottom-up construction. EFITU represents the group of inde-
pendent trade unions that chose the former option, EDLC those that went for the latter choice. 
Right after the 2011 uprising, EFITU decided to seize the opportunity offered by the relatively 
open and fluid political setting in post-revolutionary Egypt and adopted a top-down approach for 
the promotion of workers’ interests. From the very beginning, EFITU has been led by Kamal Abu 
Eita, founder of the independent union of the real-estate tax collectors, leader of the nationalist 
“Karama” party and member of the post-revolutionary parliament until it was dissolved in June 
2012. To raise its political leverage, EFITU sought to incorporate as many of the newly founded 
trade unions as possible (Abdalla 2012: 6). Hence, it quickly accepted all new trade unions that 
asked to take part in the federation. Many of these new unions, however, were rather shallow or-
ganizations that represented only a small share of the workers in their respective sector.28 Moreo-
ver, EFITU’s top-down approach created a lag between its institutional capacity for coordination 
and the rapidly increasing number of unions that had to be integrated within the new structure. 
Given EFITU’s limited staff and resources, neither the federation nor its affiliated unions were able 
to build the necessary administrative capacities. As a consequence, EFITU suffered from a lack of 
professionalism (and sometimes transparency). This contributed to splits among EFITU’s member 
organizations. In September 2013 and February 2015, two of the 25 members of EFITU’s executive 
board left the organization to build two separate trade unions federations: the General Federation 
for Egyptian Trade Unions (el-itihad al-a’m lil nikabat al-masria) and the National Federation for 
Trade Unions (al-itihad al-watani lil nikabat). By the end of 2015, several member organizations 
left EFITU and joined EDLC, including the new trade union of the Egyptian communication 
(nikabit al-masryia lel itisalat) and the Prosecutors and courts’ new trade union (nikabit al-niyabat 
wal mahakim).29 
CTUWS, which would later establish EDLC, pursued the opposite strategy, prioritizing an educa-
tional bottom-up approach of organizing workers at the grassroots level to the participation in 
national politics. A key figure, here, has been Kamal Abbas, a former labor leader at the Helwan 
Iron and Steel factory and the president of CTUWS. Since the end of the 1990s, CTUWS had 
played an important role in supporting labor leaders legally and technically. This work was guided 
by the belief that slowly teaching workers about democratic trade unionism was the only long-term 
guarantee for a sustainable and effective institutionalization of labor representation. A national 
federation should be based on strong relations between the affiliated unions, and such stable ties 
needed time and continuous joint activities to develop. In the course of 2011, therefore, CTUWS 
broke with EFITU and established the EDLC. Yet, it was not until April 2013 that EDLC was offi-
cially launched as a national trade union federation. In the meantime, CTUWS worked on enhanc-
ing union capacities and on coordinating joint activities (Abdalla 2012: 5–6). This approach of 
strengthening local unions first has provided the EDLC with a better capacity to sustain itself de-
spite of internal differences. Yet, it hasn’t protected the organization from continuous instability 
either. 
Second, the new trade unions faced a democracy dilemma. Here, the question was whether federa-
tions should conduct early elections with a view to building a democratic institution or if they 
                                                 
 
28  Interview with Noha Roshdi, leader in the real estate tax collector union and member of EFITU’s executive board, 
Januay 2016, Cairo. 
29  Interview with Saad Shaaban, the president of EDLC, Januray 2016, Cairo. 
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should preliminarily appoint experienced labor leaders and thus temporally sacrifice democracy 
for the sake of effectivity. Again, EFITU chose the first option, EDLC the latter. 
On 28 January 2011, that is only one month after its official foundation, EFITU held internal elec-
tions. Predictably, this timeframe meant that union members could hardly get to know each other. 
This privileged those labor leaders that were best known to the members due to their extensive 
presence in the federation headquarters as well as because of their efforts to facilitate the paper-
work and logistics for new unions that were seeking to join EFITU. These were, however, not nec-
essarily the most experienced or the most effective leaders. The resulting lack of experience and 
effectiveness of EFITU’s executive board harmed the federation’s legitimacy and quickly produced 
internal power struggles.30 These internal conflicts led to changes in EFITU’s national leadership. 
As these reshuffles were not the result of democratic electoral processes, they further reduced the 
internal legitimacy of the federation and generated a state of continuous instability. As a conse-
quence, EFITU became increasingly unable to genuinely represent its affiliated workers and defend 
their interests and rights. 
In the case of EDLC, by contrast, the affiliated unions had much more time to get to know each 
other and were, thus, able to take an informed decision in the internal elections that took place 
with the official launching of EDLC in April 2013. This did not prevent power struggles – in par-
ticular, the presidency has been seriously contested between competing factions – but it provided 
the organization with better means to deal with internal differences. Later, in February 2014, the 
holding of a general assembly meeting prevented the division of the federation.31 In this meeting, 
EDLC democratically decided to dismiss the elected president and convoke new elections for the 
presidency. This capacity to solve internal crises in its early years of existence, again, was also due 
to the supportive role of CTUWS, which supported the holding of this general assembly and ap-
proved the dismissal of EDLC’s president. CTUWS’s interference in EDLC’s affairs, however, also 
put a strain on the federation’s independency and internal democracy. 
Third, both new trade union federations encountered a foreign support dilemma: They quickly 
had to decide whether to accept external support at the risk of being discredited by the authorities 
or whether to refuse such foreign help and thus lose sorely needed technical and/or logistical assis-
tance. 
In terms of resources, both EFITU and EDLC saw themselves entrapped in a vicious circle. Both 
federations were hardly able to mobilize the funds needed to cover basic costs such as the salaries 
of their administrative employees, the rent of their offices, and costs for flyers etc. As previously 
mentioned, the new federations suffered from the fact that part of their affiliated members contin-
ued to belong to ETUF in order to keep their access to social funds and, therefore, did not pay 
membership fees to either EFITU or EDLC. At the same time, this lack of financial resources has 
limited the federations’ capacity to act on behalf of their affiliated local unions. This perception of 
ineffectiveness further reduced the interest among the member unions to financially support the 
federations.32  
In this context, support by foreign institutions was obviously most welcome. In the aftermath of 
the 2011 uprising, a wide range of foreign institutions decided to support the new trade union 
movement.33 They mostly offered technical support in terms of capacity building, but sometimes 
                                                 
 
30  Interview with Fatma Ramada, leader in the new trade union of the employees of the Ministry of Labor in Giza and ex-
member of EFITU’s executive board, January 2016, Cairo. 
31  Seham Shouada, An urgent meeting in EDLC to dismiss its President, Al-Shououk, 3 January 2014, available at: 
http://bit.ly/29droUh. 
32  Interview with Noha Roshdi, leader in the real estate tax collector union and member of EFITU’s executive board, 
Januray 2016, Cairo. 
33  Interview with Mohamed Mostafa, ILO officer in Egypt, January 2016, Cairo. These include international organizations 
(such as the International Labor Organization (ILO), the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC), the Inter-
national Transport Workers' Federation (ITF), the Public Services International (PSI) and the Industrial Global Union 
(IGU)) as well as organizations affiliated to certain European countries (such as the Danish Development Assistance 
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also directly helped by covering financial costs (for flyers or headquarters). While crucial in sus-
taining the rise and organization of the new trade unions, this foreign support generated several 
problems that, in effect, hindered a sustainable development of the national federations. Direct 
financial support from the outside weakened the internal solidarity among the workers, the main 
source of cohesion of the independent trade unions.34 The capacity building workshops offered to 
labor leaders contributed to deepen the split between the leadership and the rank and file and pro-
duced internal competition for travel and training opportunities. For disappointed labor leaders, 
establishing a new trade union or even building a new federation became a way to attract funds 
and travelling opportunities. In general, the reliance on foreign support (or on support by local 
NGOs that were, on their part, funded by foreign institution) made the new trade union move-
ment dependent, in some ways resembling the state dependency of the official trade union federa-
tion.35  
In sum, these dilemmas help understand why the rise of Egypt’s new trade unions has led to an 
institutionally fragmented, organizationally weak and only partially representative movement. To 
date, EFITU suffers from splits among its affiliated unions and the disengagement of its members. 
In comparison, EDLC is more stable and less effected by internal splits but, still, far from a consol-
idated organization. Both federations continue to lack the institutional capacity to exert a signifi-
cant influence on the authorities. 
(c) Movement entrepreneurs 
Similar to the Brazilian experience, well-known labor leaders have been crucial in the emergence of 
independent trade unions and the construction of new trade union federations. Abu Eita, who led 
the real-estate tax collector mobilization in 2007 and was key in the foundation of the real-estate 
tax collectors’ union in 2009, can be regarded as a pioneer of Egypt’s new unionism. As leading 
member of the Karama Nasseriste Party as well as of the Kefaya movement, Abu Eita was widely 
known also at the level of national politics. A second key figure is Kamal Abbas, a former labor 
leader at the Helwan Iron and Steel factory and president of CTUWS. Through CTUWS, Abbas 
lent major support to the labor mobilizations prior to 2011 and played an important role in Egyp-
tian civil society on the national level. While these leaders were important in the emergence of the 
new trade union movement prior to the 2011 uprising, the dependence of the movement on these 
two persons has also harmed its capacity to act democratically and effectively in the post-
revolutionary period. 
Most notably, in the aftermath of the 2011 uprising, Kamal Abbas and Kamal Abu Eita refused to 
unite and establish one national federation which would organize all independent trade unions. 
While the organizational split into two (and more) new labor federations also resulted from differ-
ent strategic visions (as explained earlier), the competition between the two powerful labor leaders 
– and their inability to cooperate – certainly contributed to dividing the movement. This is con-
firmed by the fact that programmatic differences between EFITU and EDLC can hardly account 
for their separation: They both, for instance, demanded to increase the minimum wage to 1,200 
Egyptian pounds and supported Ahmed El-Borei’s trade union law (Abdalla 2012). For ephemeral 
times, the two federations worked together for instance in the framework of “The National Front 
for the Defense of Labor Rights and Trade Unions’ Freedoms” established in October 2012 to 
achieve these objectives.36 In the aftermath of the uprising, the split of the new trade union move-
                                                                                                                                     
 
Programs (DANIDA), the Confederation of Professionals in Denmark (FTF) and the German political foundation 
Friedrich Ebert (FES)). 
34  Interview with Mostafa Bassiouni, journalist specialized in labor issues, July 2015, Cairo. 
35  Interview with Fatma Ramada, leader in the new trade union of the employees of the Ministry of Labor in Giza and ex-
member of EFITU’s executive board, op.cit. 
36  The New Trade Unions announce the Foundation of The National Front for the Defense of Labor Rights, 15 October 
2012, Al-Youm al-Sabei, available at: http://www.youm7.com/story/0000/0/0/-/817064 
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ment has severely limited its capacity to shape the political debate and put pressure on the succes-
sive governments. 
Within EFITU, Abu Eita’s key role became particularly problematic when he accepted the ap-
pointment as Minister of Labor in July 2013 – just after the military intervention in early July that 
deposed President Morsi. The fact that Abu Eita, along with other members of EFITU’s executive 
board, lent explicit support to the al-Sisi regime without gaining any significant concessions in 
terms of worker demands deepened the split between the federation’s leaders on one hand and 
between the latter and the local unions on the other. For instance, despite acting as the responsible 
minister, Abu Eita still failed to enact the law on trade union freedoms – one of the main demands 
of the new trade union movement. Moreover, the minimum wage was exclusively adopted for 
government workers, excluding both the general public and the entire private sector. As a result, 
workers lost confidence in their leader, who provided political support to the regime without re-
ceiving anything in return (Abdalla 2015a). Within EFITU, Abu Eita failed to establish institution-
al mechanism for dealing with conflicts between unions and labor leaders. Conflict resolution, 
therefore, solely depended on Abu Eita’s charisma.37 
Within EDLC, the interference of CTUWS leader Abbas in EDLC affairs likewise proved harmful 
to the development of the federation. As mentioned earlier, in its early stages, EDLC clearly bene-
fited from the legal and technical support provided by CTUWS. But at later stages, the continuous 
interference of CTUWS in EDLC’s affairs prevented the development of internal mechanisms of 
democracy, while the permanent tutoring hindered the capacity of the federation to work autono-
mously. 
4.3 Unity/division, linkages and allies of the independent labor movement 
In this section, we analyze how the division of organized labor in Egypt has weakened the New 
Unionist movement. During the entire post-revolutionary period but particularly since the mili-
tary intervention of July 2013, the successive governments have supported the official trade union 
federation that was, therefore, well positioned to compete with the new trade union federations for 
the representation of the workers. ETUF also benefited from the fact that the authorities continued 
to rely on the established state-corporatist structure. Furthermore, this section looks at the linkages 
between the new trade unions and their traditional allies from leftist political organization. While 
the Brazilian experience, inter alia, suggests that alliances with leftist parties should have helped the 
labor movement in the post-revolutionary period to voice socioeconomic demands and challenge 
the state-corporatist structure of relations with the state, a fruitful alliance between the New Un-
ionist movement and an inclusive workers’ party was prevented in the Egyptian case because of the 
weakness of political parties and the fragile alliance between trade unions and parties. 
(a) Division and competition 
The legal framework governing trade union affairs, traditionally determined by the Law 35, prom-
ulgated in 1976, and amended by law 1 promulgated in 1981, recognizes ETUF as the only legiti-
mate and legal federal body of labor representation. Although the 2011 uprising created an oppor-
tunity for re-negotiating the rules of labor representation, the governments that have ruled Egypt 
since 2011 basically continued the agenda of their predecessors and combined a neoliberal agenda 
with labor containment through state corporatism. This continued reliance on ETUF significantly 
constrained the aspiration of the new trade union federations to legalize its independent structures 
of labor representation.  
                                                 
 
37  Interview with Noha Roshdi, leader in the real estate tax collector union and member of EFITU’s executive board, op. 
cit. 
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Following the elections of May/June 2012, the Morsi government adopted a neoliberal economic 
agenda that was quite similar to the one pursued by the Mubarak regime.38 The corresponding 
need to take unpopular economic decisions – including the reduction of the subsidies on fuel, as 
suggested by the IMF – meant that the Morsi government was keen to constrain labor’s potential 
to resist these policies. Strengthening ETUF vis-à-vis the movement of independent trade unions 
proved useful in this regard. This was all the more the case because leaders of the Muslim Brother-
hood’s Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) had gained some leadership positions within ETUF’s tran-
sitional administration committee, including the treasurer (Yousry Bayoumi) and the vice-
president (Khaled El-Azhari).39 When Khaled El-Azhari, who had also served as vice-president of 
the parliamentary labor committee, was appointed as Minister of Labor in August 2012,40 the FJP 
consolidated its control over ETUF. The new minister supported the FJP’s draft for the new trade 
union law which, unlike El-Borei’s draft, would strengthen ETUF’s position vis-à-vis the new un-
ions. This draft, for example, did refrain from allowing workers that leave ETUF to retain their 
share of the social funds controlled by the federation. Hence, as explained above, workers willing 
to establish or join independent unions would continue to lose their social benefits. If adopted, this 
law would, thus, directly benefit ETUF vis-à-vis the competing trade union federations. 
Following President Morsi’s ouster in July 2013, the new military-led government and the new 
president Abdel Fatah Al-Sisi adopted policies that made the balance of power even more unfavor-
able to the new trade union movement. The overall formula was based on the idea of keeping polit-
ical nasserism while ignoring economic nasserism (Adly and Ramadan 2015). Thus, the Al-Sisi 
government’s strategy consisted in liberalizing the economy at the expense of workers’ interests, 
re-establishing ETUF’s monopoly on labor representation and increasing repression of labor pro-
tests while calling for national unity in support of the regime.41 In order to guarantee its control 
over ETUF, the new government endorsed the replacement of 80% of ETUF’s executive board 
members, which of course included all FJP members, by labor leaders loyal to the regime (Bishara 
2014). In consultancy with the heads of ETUF’s General Unions, this replacement has been con-
ducted by Abdel Fathah Ibrahim, the head of the General Union for Spinning and Waving who 
later became ETUF’s president.42 At the same time, the Al-Sisi government also tried to contain 
EFITU by appointing Kamal Abu Eita as the Minister of Labor. As mentioned above, Abu Eita was 
not able to enforce the adoption of a new trade union law against resistance in the council of min-
isters and also failed to convince interim president Adly Mansour to promulgate it (Abdalla 
2015a).  
When, in February 2014, Abu Eita was replaced in the Ministry of Labor by Nahed Al-Asheri, 
ETUF returned as the official interlocutor and sole representative of Egypt’s workers. Al-Asheri 
invited only ETUF to discuss labor-related legislation, the draft trade union law included, and 
entirely ignored the claims made by the new trade unions federations. In November 2015, under 
yet another minister of labor (Gamal Sourour),43 the government further tightened its rejection of 
                                                 
 
38  This agenda was further consolidated by the negotiations that President Morsi pursued with the IMF in late August 
2012, in return for a $4.8 billion IMF loan (Abdalla 2015a). 
39  Following a corresponding court decision, the Council of Ministers in August 2011 dissolved ETUF’s administration 
board and replaced it by a ”transitional administration committee” whose role was to manage the institution until new 
internal elections could take place. This transitional committee was formed by former Minister of Labor Ahmed El-
Borei and brought together former trade unionists rather close to the old regime with several militant labor leaders that 
had openly opposed the old regime. In this transition board, the Muslim Brotherhood was given three seats. 
40  For a complete profile of the Minister of Labor, please see Al-Youm Al-Sabaei Egyptian newspaper: http://www. 
youm7.com/News.asp?NewsID=747634&  
41  The Al-Sisi government’s economic orientation was confirmed, for instance, by the unpopular decision in July 2014 to 
reduce subsidies on fuel as suggested by the IMF (Abdalla 2014). 
42  Abdel Fathah Ibrahim: The Dismissal of Gebally Al-Margahi is 100% Legitimate, 7 September 2013, Masress, available 
at: http://bit.ly/29t9QpH. 
43  For more information about Gamal Sourrour, see: Aya Al-Wahy, seven informations about Gamal Sourour the new 
Minister of Labor, September 19 2015, Al-Watan, available on: http://bit.ly/29hlu7g. 
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the independent trade union federations and issued a declaration qualifying the new trade unions 
as illegal entities. Employers were urged not to deal with them and only recognize trade unions 
affiliated with ETUF.44 In February 2016, the Minister of Labor announced that the new trade 
union law will not admit the presence of more than one union per workplace, which would effec-
tively prevent independent trade unions from competing with ETUF in workplaces where the 
latter already exists.45 At the time of writing, however, the draft new trade union law had yet to be 
sent to parliament.  
In sum, trade union affairs in post-Mubarak Egypt have emerged as a major arena of political 
struggle, rendering the new trade unions targets of political contestation rather than drivers of 
reform (Bishara 2014:4). As a part of their overall aim to liberalize the economy while de-
liberalizing the political sphere, the successive governments have sought to marginalize the new 
labor movement. In particular, following Morsi’s ouster, they did so by consolidating governmen-
tal control over ETUF and delaying a new trade union law that would legalize the structures of an 
independent labor movement. As a result, the state-controlled ETUF finally reestablished the posi-
tion it had held before the 2011 uprising, while the new trade unions saw themselves relegated to 
illegal organizations disregarded by the political regime.  
(b) Partisan linkages and sociopolitical allies 
Similar to its Brazilian counterpart, Egypt’s new trade union movement was characterized by dis-
trust in established leftist organizations. This reflected near Egyptian history such as the crack-
down of the 2008 Mahalla labor strike. For many labor leaders and workers, the brutally repressed 
protest at the Misr Company for Spinning and Weaving, located in Mahalla, on 6 April 2008 
demonstrated what happens when political actors use the labor movement for their own political 
purposes and, thereby, prevent workers from achieving their own economic demands. In this case, 
cyber activists transformed labor’s call for a strike and sit-in inside the factory into a call for a “na-
tional” strike. Supported by several opposition parties and movements, the economic demands of 
the labor movement were, thus, turned into a harsh critique of the broader social and political 
situation in the country – including a critique of continuous price increases, wide-spread corrup-
tion, and the torture of political activists by the police. While since 2005 the regime had rarely 
resorted to violence in response to workers’ protests, this politicization arguably led the security 
apparatus to demand a demobilization of the workers, oblige labor leaders to call off the strike and 
arrest all leaders that would not give in. This experience at Mahalla deepened the split between 
labor organizations and political opposition groups, and until today the labor movement, particu-
larly the rank and file, remains suspicious of an involvement in politics (Abdalla 2012: 2).  
During the transitional period and despite the temporary political opening in the aftermath of the 
2011 uprising, this skepticism of an explicitly political engagement remained the norm for labor 
leaders especially at the local level. Workers mistrusted parties because of their potential to divide 
them according to competing ideological approaches. In addition, the weakness of leftist parties 
meant that workers and unions could hardly benefit from such alliances. For instance, in the 2011 
and 2012 elections, the leftist coalition “Revolution Continues” achieved only 8 of 508 parliamen-
tary seats. The two remaining leftist parties that were not part of this coalition, tajammu’ Party and 
the Egyptian Social Democratic Party, won 3 and 16 seats, respectively. As parties remain unable to 
provide the workers with concrete political impact, the latter feel that they are being used by par-
ties to exploit their leverage (Abdalla 2012). The lack of an effective channel to voice political op-
position, furthermore, pushed labor leaders (especially on the local level) to engage in direct nego-
tiations with state authorities. 
                                                 
 
44  Mostafa Al-Nigar, The Independent Trade Unions provide the Council of Minister with a Report affirming the legal 
proves of its legitimacy, 24 December 2015, Al-Youm al-Sabei’, available at: http://bit.ly/29ibxYs. 
45  Ghada Abdel Hafiz, Gamal Sourour: I won’t Recognize Independent Trade Unions, 4 February 2016, Al-Masry Al-
Youm, available at: http://bit.ly/29l6m9E. 
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In the years since 2011, therefore, the new trade union movement has chosen to ally with political 
organizations only under specific circumstances, namely when communication and negotiation 
with the state broke down entirely and/or when such alliances were temporarily seen as mutually 
beneficial. In this sense, for example, the reluctance of the FJP Minister of Labor, Khaled Al-
Azhari, to promulgate a new trade union law pushed EDLC and EFITU to ally with the National 
Salvation Front (NSF), an alliance of the non-Islamist parties, in order to ensure the latter’s sup-
port to Ahmed El-Borei’s draft law in the next parliament (which was, however, never elected). 
With the worsening of the relations with the Morsi government, the new union movement started 
to believe that it had nothing more to lose and that the price of activism was not too high anymore 
and, consequently, resorted to street politics. In fact, labor leaders responded positively to the call 
by the “Rebellion” (Tamarod) youth movement, and in June 2013 the new union movement joined 
the anti-Morsi protests. The two federations issued press releases officially announcing their soli-
darity and their participation in the demonstrations that pushed for early presidential elections.46  
During the Al-Sisi regime, it was again a deadlock in the negotiations with the state that pushed the 
new trade unions to form a “Workers’ Bloc” (al-kutla al-‘ummaliya). Under the auspices of the 
CTUWS, this bloc was formed in July 2014 with a membership of around 120 new trade unions, 
including members of both EFITU and EDLC. The new trade union leaders that are members of 
this bloc were supposed to explicitly express their support for the electoral list of “Egypt Awaken-
ing” (sahwit masr) during the parliamentary elections of 2015. This electoral list was formed by a 
coalition of independent candidates as well as leftist political parties that support the demands of 
the new trade unions (Abdalla 2015b). However, due to logistical complications, Sahwit masr 
withdrew from the elections in the last minute.  
Under increasing pressure from the political regime, the new trade union movement welcomed the 
solidarity of political forces that supported their resistance against the Al-Sisi government’s at-
tempt to de-legalize the new trade unionism in Egypt. Hence, the campaign in support of inde-
pendent trade unions which was launched by the Bread and Freedom Leftist Party (Al-Eish wal 
Horeyia) (under foundation), under the motto “Together for Unions’ Freedoms” (maa’an min agl 
al-huriyat al-nikabia),47 was greeted by the new trade union movement.48 
In sum, the new union movement’s contentious interaction with the state in the post-revolutionary 
period has led to a pragmatic, yet very gradual change in the relationship with political parties and 
movements. Still, as labor leaders are struggling hard with preventing a further disintegration of 
the movement, the attempts to strike broader political alliances are at best cautious – when com-
pared to the experience of the Brazilian Workers’ Party, for instance. For the time being, these 
alliances offer little to the new trade union federations in terms of a possibility to channel the 
workers’ demands into the political system. 
4.4 Collective action frame 
The emergence of the new trade union movement was based on a rather narrow agenda of specific, 
socioeconomic demands. With the relative opening of the political space in the aftermath of the 
2011 uprising, however, the independent trade unions seized the opportunity and – similarly to the 
Brazilian experience – broadened their agenda to include politico-institutional claims for labor 
freedom and a new, democratic structure of state-labor relations. At the same time, however, and 
contrary to the Brazilian case, the new unions’ collective action frame has largely remained labor-
specific and stopped short of openly challenging the respective political authorities, with the tem-
                                                 
 
46  For further information, see: Heba EL-SHAZLI, Where were the Egyptian Workers in the June 2013 Peoples’ Coup?, 
July 2013, Jadaliyya, available at: http://bit.ly/29qfj34. 
47  Another campaign having the same name was launched by CTUWS as well. 
48  Interview with Talal Shukr, former head of the new trade union for pensioners and current coordinator of CTUWS 
branch in Cairo, Cairo, January 2016, and interview with Fatma Ramadan, labor activist and leader in the new trade 
union of the employees of the Labor Ministry in Giza, op. cit. 
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porary exception of the anti-Morsi protests in 2013. This strategy reflected the perceived weakness 
of the new labor movement as well as the increasingly authoritarian setting in which it operated, in 
particular following the military intervention of July 2013. As we will argue, this fairly narrow 
collective action frame has further reduced the capacity of the New Unionist movement to building 
linkages (by bridging frames) with other sociopolitical forces.  
Under the repressive Mubarak regime, the wave of labor protests that responded to the policies of 
economic liberalization were characterized by a collective action frame that deliberately refrained 
from challenging the political regime. On the one hand, labor protests at that time did not chal-
lenge the regime’s legitimacy, rejected any politicization and framed their claims in strictly eco-
nomic terms. These claims mostly included tangible and short-term demands such as bonuses and 
allowances or, at most, wage increases. On the other hand, labor protests also refused to question 
the state-corporatist, patron-client relationship with the state. Thus, the existing structure of labor 
representation and the official trade union federation were not questioned. The only exception was 
the (successful) attempt of the real-estate tax collector movement to establish an independent trade 
union. This overall refusal to challenge the state arguably reflected both a fear of repression and the 
deep-seated, Nasserist belief among public and governmental workers in their partnership with the 
state.  
In the aftermath of the 2011 uprising, the deteriorating socio-economic situation led not only to an 
expansion in the number of labor protests. The uprising also provided the new trade union move-
ment with the political space to challenge the old pattern of state-labor relations. As a conse-
quence, hundreds of newly emerging trade unions questioned the state-corporatist structure. 
While new trade unions leaders focused on butter and bread demands in response to their rank 
and file, the demand for a new trade union law that would legalize independent unions and the 
claim for a general minimum wage became parts of a broader collective action frame that united 
the new trade union movement. These demands related to freedom of association and social justice 
also enabling the bridging of claims with other oppositional organizations. As mentioned above, 
under the Morsi government, the new trade union federations allied with the secular NSF around 
this claim. And under the As-Sisi government, the struggle for a new trade unions law generated 
some solidarity among leftist politicians and parties and led to the above-mentioned campaigns 
that linked the general freedom of association with labor freedoms. 
Nevertheless, given the fragmentation of the new trade union movement on the national level, the 
unfavorable balance of power (in particular after the military intervention of July 2013) as well as 
the weakness of the political parties, the local new trade unions refrained from openly breaking 
with the state. Thus, in the context of specific labor protests, they have largely continued to frame 
their demands in ways that would not challenge the authorities. Examples include the unions of 
the real estate tax collectors and of the sales tax collectors that both fought against a new civil serv-
ant law but refused to link up with any political force.49 In order to prevent parliamentary approval 
of this law, these two unions organized protests against it and tried to on exert pressure on mem-
bers of parliament,50 but they did so in far from confrontational ways. Rather, the leaders of these 
trade unions have framed the employees’ claims in a way that stressed their partnership with the 
state and emphasized their refusal to challenge the latter.  
Such narrow collective action frames that focus on rather specific and short-term demands also 
reflected the thinking of important labor leaders and their relation to politics as well as the relative 
disconnection between the different trade union levels within the labor federations. While the top 
level of the new trade union federations has included politicized leaders such as Kamal Abu Eita 
(in the case of EFITU), most local trade union leaders can rather be described as “service leaders” 
or “natural leaders”: Their status as leaders is directly linked to their capacity to serve the short-
                                                 
 
49  Interview with Noha Roshdi, leader at the real estate tax collector new trade union, January 2016, Cairo. 
50  Interview with Tarek Koaib, the head of the Real Estate Tax Collector New Trade Union, January 2016, Cairo. 
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term, economic demands of the local rank and file. Contrary to the 1970s and 1980s, during which 
politicized, leftist or Nasserite leaders led the labor movement, the new generation of leaders at the 
level of the local federations is largely depoliticized. These local labor leaders, therefore, hardly 
support the national federations’ push for a more substantial change in state-labor relations but are 
much more interested in achieving some tangible results for their social bases (Abdalla 2015b). In 
this context, the horizontal and vertical mechanisms of coordination within the new trade union 
federations have been too weak to generate consensus around a broader collective action frame. 
The rather narrow nature of the demands raised by the new trade union movement, therefore, 
reflects not only the increasingly difficult political context in which it once again operates and the 
weakness of the movement’s potential sociopolitical allies but also the failure of the movement 
itself to establish reliable internal structures of coordination and representation. 
5 CONCLUSION 
Although the 2011 uprising opened up significant political space for a thriving movement of inde-
pendent labor organizations, Egypt’s new trade unions were not able to seize the opportunity and 
renegotiate the rules of labor representation with a view to establishing a new pattern of state-labor 
relations. Contrary to the New Unionist movement in Brazil, which was able to exert a significant 
political influence during the protracted process of democratization in this country, its Egyptian 
counterpart has been unable to achieve any of its objectives following Mubarak’s downfall, despite 
the role it has played in the run-up to the uprising. A brief period of impressive organizational 
growth and continuing protests notwithstanding, the movement of independent trade unions in 
the end turned from being a driver of change during the destabilization of the Mubarak regime 
into a fairly weak and politically marginalized actor during the post- revolutionary period. Our 
analysis of the Egyptian case, as compared to the experience of the Brazilian New Unionist move-
ment in the 1980s, suggests that four main factors help explain this process of political marginali-
zation. 
First, economically, the structural basis of Egypt’s New Unionism was much weaker than in the 
case of Brazil. This is a result of a different sequence of political liberalization and neoliberal eco-
nomic reforms. In Brazil, political liberalization and the emergence of an independent labor 
movement preceded the economic crises, austerity measures and neoliberal reforms of the 1980s 
and 1990s. As a consequence, organized labor in Brazil could still rely on a relatively strong socio-
economic basis when it confronted the dual challenge of pushing for political change while staging 
resistance to austerity measures and neoliberal structural adjustment. In Egypt, the sequence has 
been reversed so that the independent trade union movement emerged in a much more difficult 
socioeconomic context.  
Second, politically, the revolutionary character of the Egyptian uprising, although initially stimu-
lating as assumed by the political opportunity structure approach, posed a series of organizational 
challenges to the New Unionist movement. In Brazil, the gradual process of political liberalization 
and democratization has meant that independent labor organizations there had several years to 
grow from the bottom up and build a powerful, grassroots-based movement with a political arm 
before direct presidential elections introduced potentially divisive political dynamics. In Egypt, in 
contrast, the independent labor movement, in early 2011, had to respond collectively to the dra-
matic political changes while it lacked any organizational structure and was simultaneously experi-
encing a rapid emergence of new unions. The comparison with Brazil suggests that it was this all-
too swift change in political opportunities that overwhelmed the incipient New Unionist move-
ment rather than the continuities in terms of state corporatism and repression – the latter also 
characterized the Brazilian context throughout the 1980s and, in this case, proved rather stimulat-
ing to sustained confrontational mobilization. Repression as such, obviously, can either discourage 
or provoke contentious action. 
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These two factors combined to produce a new trade union movement in Egypt that lacked social 
penetration and a consolidated structure of grassroots organization and was incapable of establish-
ing an organizational structure at the national level that would have enabled internal democracy 
and the capacity to act collectively, unitedly and independently. The result was an institutionally 
fragmented, organizationally weak and only partially representative movement that proved unable 
to resist the continuity, and even deepening, of repressive, state-corporatist state-labor relations. 
But for this result, third, agency also mattered as was demonstrated by the ambivalent role of key 
movement entrepreneurs. In Brazil, the role of the most prominent labor leader, Lula da Silva, was 
crucial in creating the broad alliance of sociopolitical forces that formed the PT and the CUT. The 
rivalry between Abu Eita and Kamal Abbas in Egypt, in contrast, contributed to the division of the 
movement. The overall risk that was implied by labor movements’ dependence on individual lead-
ers became manifest in Egypt when Abu Keita became Minister of Labor, whereas in the case of 
Brazil similar problems would emerge only much later when Lula was elected president of Brazil in 
2002 (cf. Sluyter-Beltrão 2010). 
Fourth, Egypt’s independent labor movement was not only intrinsically weak but also suffered 
from a lack of reliable alliances with other social or political organizations. This is perhaps the 
starkest contrast to Brazil’s New Unionism which, from the very beginning, emerged in direct 
relationship with a whole set of like-minded grassroots movements, which included close personal 
ties and overlaps. The PT was, therefore, never only a workers’ party, and the collective action 
frame always combined a labor-specific and a general political and social justice-related agenda. 
Even the rival, traditional trade union sector in Brazil was much closer to the new labor movement, 
shared a series of basic objectives, and was never as fully coopted by the state as ETUF in Egypt; in 
specific episodes, the two labor federations also joined forces. In contrast, the New Unionist 
movement in Egypt was fairly isolated most of the times, and support from other sociopolitical 
organizations remained sporadic and issue-specific. The movement’s fairly narrow collective ac-
tion frame both reflected and reinforced this relative isolation. As a result, the Egyptian govern-
ment could easily use ETUF to marginalize the independent trade unions. At the same time, the 
potential allies of the movement from leftist political organizations were hardly able to provide 
support to the new trade union movement and/or to channel New Unionist demands into the 
political system. 
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